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Hellman: Step Parent Visitation

THE CHILD, THE STEP PARENT, AND THE STATE:
STEP PARENT VISITATION AND THE VOICE OF THE
CHILD.
Stephen Hellman*

I. INTRODUCTION
Under common law principles, natural parents had a primafacie
legal right to the independent custody and visitation of their
children to the exclusion of all others.' The courts recognized that
a natural parent's right to raise a child free from state interference
was a fundamental liberty interest. 2 Under the ancient concept of
parens patriae, the state was the ultimate guardian of children.
Only in instances of concern for the child's welfare could the state
invoke its parenspatriaepower and intrude upon parental control.4
Concern for the child's welfare focused primarily upon ensuring
that the child was free from physical harm, 5 or preserving the
child's right to access to education. 6 The notion that natural
parents had absolute control over their children precluded a
stepparent from attaining standing in order to petition a court for

* Stephen R. Hellman, Esq., J.D., 1997, Hofstra University School of Law.
He is a solo practitioner , professor of criminal law, and former law clerk,
concentrating the fields of matrimonial, family and criminal law.
1Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So.2d 1032, 1033 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
2 See In re Smith v. Lascaris, 106 Misc.2d 1044, 1046, 432 N.Y.S.2d 995, 997
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1980) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534535 (1925)); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
3 Smith, 106 Misc.2d at 1046-47, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
4 Id. at 1047, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
5 See, e.g., Humphrey v. Humphrey, 103 Misc.2d 175, 177, 425 N.Y.S.2d 759,
760-61 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980) (noting that "[t]he state, as 'parens patriae,' has the
obligation to insure the welfare of all children... but it has not displaced the
parent in right or responsibility"); see also In re Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d.
543, 546, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (1976) (quoting Pierce,
268 U.S. at 535).
6Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 824 (quoting
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,213 - 15 (1972)).
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visitation with a stepchild. The stepparent-stepchild relationship
conferred no rights and imposed no obligations.
This anachronistic view that visitation rights are primarily a
benefit to a natural parent, which was to be enjoyed in exchange
for compensation for the duty to support the child,8 has yielded to
the presumption that the state has an interest in the welfare of any
child whose familial status is affected by its laws. 9 Accordingly,
under certain circumstances, courts have recognized that the rights
of third parties, including stepparents, °to custody and visitation can
supersede those of the natural parent.
In many states, stepparents are accorded standing to petition for
visitation upon a showing that they had acted in a parental and
custodial capacity." A stepparent may show that this requirement12
has been met under the doctrines of in loco parentis,
psychological parent,' 3 "de facto parent,"' 14 and "equitable
7 Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) (holding that a stepfather

was entitled to a hearing to determine whether he stood in loco parentis to his
stepchild, and if so, if it would be in the child's best interest to allow visitation).
Id. at 68.
8 Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Neb. 1991) (quoting
Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. 1982), "[The old rule arose] from an
outmoded view that custody and visitation rights [were] primarily a benefit to
the parent to be enjoyed in compensation for the duty to support"), Id. at 12.
9 See id.
10Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So.2d 1032, 1033 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
11See, e.g., Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d at 15 (citing Collins v. Gilbreath, 403
N.E.2d 921 (Ind. 1980)).
12 Gribble,583 P.2d at 66. The court provided:
The term in loco parentis means in place of a parent, and a
person in loco parentis is one who has assumed the status and
obligations of a parent without the formal adoption. Whether
or not one.. .assumes that status depends on whether the
person intends to assume that obligation.
Id.
13 Temple v. Meyer, 544 A.2d 629, 632 n.3 (Conn. 1988) (quoting J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOINrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 98 (1979)).
A psychological parent is one who, on a continuing day-to-day
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and
mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as
well as the child's physical needs. The psychological parent may
be a biological ... adoptive, foster, or common law... parent, or
any other person.
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parent."' 5 Once this threshold is met, the court will consider
whether visitation by the stepparent would be in the best interests
of the child. 16 The rights of natural parents and all
other
7
considerations are subordinate to this paramount concern.t
The next inquiry the court may make is whether the child's
preference should be considered in determining what is in the best
interest of that child in a stepparent visitation hearing. While the
adage "children should be seen and not heard" has endured within
the legal system, the modem day child is considered to have rights,
one of which is to voice his or her opinion and have it heard,8
especially when it is voiced regarding interpersonal relationships.'
This note explores the tripartite relationship between the child,
the stepparent, and the state. First, it will address the common law
history of the autonomy of the parent-child relationship. Second, it
will focus upon avenues available to stepparents in order to attain
standing to petition for visitation with their stepchildren in states
where explicit statutory grants are absent. Third, the note will
explore the consideration of the voice of the child when the court
utilizes the doctrine of "the best interests of the child" in stepparent
visitation determinations.

IaL

14 In re B.G. v. San Bernardino County Welfare Dep't et al., 523 P.2d 244, 253
n.18 (Cal. 1974) (stating that the court "use[s] the term 'de facto parent' to refer
to that person who, on a day-to day basis, assumes the role of parent, seeking to
fulfill both the child's physical needs and his psychological need for affection
and care").
15 Atkinson

v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. App. 1987) (stating that

a non-biological father may be considered an "equitable parent" when the
husband and the child acknowledge the father and child relationship, or the
mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship
over a period of time, and the husband desires the rights afforded a natural
parent, and the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child
support).
6Gribble,583 P.2d at 68 (citing Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1977)).
17 See e.g., Spells, 378 A.2d at 882 (holding that the child's interests are
paramount, and that a stepfather could not be denied the right to visit his
stepchildren simply because he had no blood relation).
I Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
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COMMON LAW HISTORY OF THE PARENTCHILD RELATIONSHIP

NaturalParentsRights in Conflict With State Interests
It has been recognized that natural parents have full custodial
rights over their children, 19 which encompasses the right to decide
who may or may not associate with their children. 20 The common
law presumed that the "best interests of a child" were served by the
rearing of the child by its natural parents. 2 1 At common law,
stepparent visitation was denied solely upon the natural parent's
custodial right to refuse consent, even if the child's best interests
would have been served by the visitation. 23 It was well established
that an award of visitation rights over a natural parent's
objections
24
rights.
custodial
parent's
that
upon
infringe
would
Furthermore, the state adhered to the parental rights doctrine,
and refused recognition of any relationship compacted by adults,
except for the legal parents of the child.2 5 Third party relationships
were acknowledged only in situations where the legal parents
26
abandoned the child, or upon certification that they were unfit.
In virtually all other situations third parties were unable to
challenge the will of the natural parent, as the stepparent-stepchild
relationship conferred neither rights nor obligations at common
law. 7
However, this "right to decide" is no longer such an absolute.
The parental right presumption, which is one of fact and not law,
19 In re Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d 141, 144, 511 N.E.2d 75, 77, 517
N.Y.S.2d
932, 934 (1987).
20

id.

21Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d 546,
22 Susan M. Silverman,

356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
Stepparent Visitation Rights: Towards the Best

Interests of the Child, 30 J. FAM. L. 943, 952 (1991/92).
23 Tinsley v. Plummer, 519 N.E.2d 752, 754 (Ind. 1988). The "best interest of
the child" standard is utilized only after a cognizable right to visitation has been
established. This standard does not determine the existence of the right. The
party petitioning for visitation bears the burden of establishing the threshold
requirement of the existence of a custodial and parental relationship. Id.
24 Silverman, supra note 22, at 952.
25

Id.

26 Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 825.

27 Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66.
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may be overcome by the stepparent by production of sufficient
evidence that visitation is in the child's best interests.28 For
instance, where it has been determined that a stepparent has
nurtured a stepchild as his or her own, a natural parent's "mere
objection," based upon an assertion that the child would be harmed
by ordered visitation, does not preclude such an order in all
instances. 29 Moreover, the modem day child is no longer perceived
as a sub-person bound to his or her natural parents by an
irrevocable and absolute right of possession.30 "A child has
rights .... 31
Consequently, courts have recognized that in a visitation dispute,
the child(ren)'s interests are paramount, 32 and "[t]he rights of
parents must yield to that superior demand. 33 Since the welfare of
the child is of paramount importance in a stepparent visitation
action, 34 that interest supersedes parental rights, and subordinates
all other considerations. 35
While the doctrine of parental
preference was one in which a parental interest in a child was
analogous to that of a property owner's interest in its chattel, in
28 Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826.

Hughes v. Banning, 541 N.E.2d 283, 284 (Ind. 1989) (quoting Collins, 403
N.E.2d at 923); See also LoPresti v. LoPresti, 51 A.D.2d 578, 378 N.Y.S.2d
487 (1976) (holding objection by natural parent not sufficient to deny third party
visitation rights); See also Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (holding common law
presumption is one of fact and not law, which may be overcome by sufficient
evidence). But cf Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So.2d 1032, 1033 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1990) (stating natural parents presumptive right to custody and control of
their children will not be superseded unless rebutted by a showing that they were
unfit
30 or incapable of providing for the best interests of their children).
Honaker v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322, 326 (W. Va. 1989).
31 Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 825 (quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969));
see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
32 Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 159 A.D.2d 113, 116, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596,
599 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that the trial court erred in not ascertaining
the true wishes of the children, who were 15 and 13 at the time of trial and
concededly mature).
33 Id. (quoting Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 247 N.E.2d 842, 299
N.Y.S.2d 842 (1969).
34 Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66.
35
Id. at 68.
36
I re B.G. v. San Bernardino County Welfare Dep't et al., 523 P.2d 244, 254
(Cal. 1974).
29
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Looper v. McManus,37 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
natural parent does not have a per se property right to his or her
child.38 The parental interest was deemed analogous to a trust,
subjected to the regulation and control of the state.
Although a few jurisdictions still question whether it is in the
child's best interests to award visitation to an ex- stepparent, 40 who
is "legally a mere 'non-parent,' over the objections of a natural
parent,"4 1 it is now generally recognized and accepted that
visitation is awarded primarily to benefit the child.42 For example,
in New York, the state may intervene43 and subordinate the rights
of natural parents 44 to those of the child,45 when rare or
extraordinary circumstances 46 exist that affect the "best interests of

37 581 P.2d 487 (OkIa. 1978).
31 Id. at 489.
39 id.

40 Stepparents are most often excluded from child issues. Martin L. Haines III,

Rights of Others in the Lives of Children. Should "Substitute" Parents Have
Legal Rights to Child Visitation?, 14 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RIGHTS JOURNAL, 1315 (1993).
41 Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So.2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
42 Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. 1979) (holding that the lower
court erred by failing to hold a hearing to determine if it would be in the best
interest of the child to place a limit on the custody award by granting visitation
to his stepmother).
43 In re Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d. 543, 544, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (1976). "The state may not deprive a natural parent of the
custody of a child absent surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness
or other like extraordinary circumstances." Id.
44 Humphrey v. Humphrey, 103 Misc.2d 175, 177-78, 425 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1980). The legislature, by the enactment of Article 6 and Article
10 of the Family Court Act, intended to provide due process for determining
when the state "may intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child
so45that his needs are properly met." Id.
Trapp v. Trapp, 126 Misc. 2d 30, 31,480 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1984) (holding that the stepfather had standing to seek visitation rights with his
stepchildren where he had lived with the children's stepmother for almost nine
years).
46 See id. (finding that disruption of a child's home through the dissolution of
his familial structure has been considered an extraordinary circumstance); see
also Alberto B. v. Rosa 0., 423 N.Y.S.2d 111 (N.Y. Fam. Ct 1979) (stating that
removal of a "psychological parent" may be a traumatic event).
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the child." 47 In Trapp v. Trapp, the court found that the severance
of a relationship between a stepparent and stepchild that had
existed for nine years, during which time the child progressed
through developmentally important stages, had a disruptive effect
upon the child that created an extraordinary circumstance.4 8 Under
such conditions, the court held that it must weigh this4 9circumstance
in determining the stepparent's petition for visitation.
ll.
STEP PARENT STANDING TO PETITION FOR
VISITATION
A.

Statutory Provisionsand the Absence Thereof

In many jurisdictions, a void exists with reference to the
statutory authorization, 50 which allocates to stepparents standing to
petition for visitation with a stepchild.5 While Alaska, 2
Trapp, 126 Misc.2d at 31, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 980; see also In re Bennett v.
Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (holding where
extraordinary circumstance presents conflict between the rights of natural
parents and their children, the best interests of the children are superior to
parental custody rights).
47

48 Id.
49 Id. at 31,480

N.Y.S.2d at 980.
So Haines, supra note 40 at 14. "[c]ourts are constrained to follow the
unimaginative laws of our land that begrudgingly give... rights to natural
grandparents and none to persons who have actually fulfilled the day-to-day
needs of the child ....

I"
d.

Until recently, there has been a paucity of authority pertaining to efforts by
stepparents to obtain visitation rights. Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267, 1272
(Ariz. 1982); see also Tinsley v. Plummer, 519 N.E.2d 752, 753-54 (Ind. 1989).
The legislature tacitly left the development of law pertaining to rights of parties
other than parents and grandparents to the courts, and the principle of erpressio
unius est exclusio alteriusdoes not preclude stepparent visitation in the absence
of statutory authority. ld. Furthermore, while visitation rights, pertaining to noncustodial parents, have been the subject of legislation for a long period of time,
it has been the courts, and not the legislature, that has recognized third party
visitation rights. Id
52 ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (Michie 1998). This statute provides in
51

pertinent part:

[i]n an action for divorce or for legal separation... the court
may... during the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing
or at any time thereafter during the minority of a child of the
marriage, make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or
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Utah,6
Tennessee,60
Michigan,58 5859Oregon,

[Vol. 16
Louisiana,"
Virginia,"62

visitation with the minor child that may seem necessary or proper,
including an order that provides for visitation by a grandparent or
other person if that is in the best interests of the child.
Id.
53 CAL. CIV. CODE FAM. LAW § 4351.59(b) part 5 div. 4 (West 1983) (repealed
1/1/94). The statute provides in pertinent part: "[i]f a stepparent has petitioned
or otherwise applied for an order of reasonable visitation rights pursuant to this
section, the court shall set the matter of visitation rights for mediation ... ." Id.
54 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1995). The statute states in
pertinent part. "[t]he superior court may grant the right of visitation with respect
-to any minor child or children to any person, upon an application of such
person." Id.
55 HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1995). The statute states in pertinent part:
"[r]easonable visitation rights shall be awarded to parents, grandparents, and any
person interested in the welfare of the child in the discretion of the court, unless
it is shown that rights of visitation are detrimental to the best interests of the
child[.]"Id.
56 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1995). The statute states in pertinent part:
"[g]randparents and stepparents may be granted visitation rights." Id.
5 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136(b) (West 1995). The statute states in pertinent
part: "[u]nder extraordinary circumstances, a relative, by blood or affinity, or a
former stepparent... not granted custody of the child may be granted
reasonable visitation...."
51 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27.7(b) (West 1995). The statute states in
pertinent part: "[p]rovide[s] for reasonable parenting time of the child by the
parties involved, by the maternal or paternal grandparents, or by others. . . ." Id.
59 ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1), (2)(b) (1999). The statute states in pertinent
part: "(1) [a]ny person including but not limited to a related or non-related foster
parent, stepparent.., who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent
relationship with a child or any legal grandparent may petition or file a motion
for intervention with the court.. . (2)(b) ... [for] visitation rights or other
generally recognized rights of a parent or person having the ongoing personal
relationship."Id.
60 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302(a) (1995). The statute states in pertinent part,
"[t]he provisions of this subsection shall not apply in the case of any child who
has been adopted by any person other than a relative of the child or a stepparent
of the child." (Deleted by amendment in 1997).
61 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1998). The statute states in pertinent part:
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable
orders relating to the children .... In determining visitation right of the parents,
grandparents, and other members of the immediate family the court shall
consider the best interest of the child." Id.
62 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie 1995). The statute states in pertinent
part: "[u]pon the entry of the decree providing for the dissolution of a
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Washington 63 and Wisconsin 64 provide statutory visitation rights to
third parties, stepparents are only specifically mentioned in the
65
California, Kansas, Oregon, Tennessee and Wisconsin statutes.
On its face, the absence of statutory authorization for stepparent
standing to petition for visitation may seem to preclude the
stepparent from obtaining visitation. However, where statutes
provide for a determination of visitation of "any child of the
marriage," 66 the trend is for the courts to recognize that the "child
of the marriage" may be a stepchild when the stepparent is
recognized as a surrogate parent under the doctrine of in loco
parentis.67 In this context, in loco parentistypically means "in the
place of a parent."68 An individual who assumes the status and
obligations of a parent is deemed a person in loco parentis.69 The
status of in loco parentis is conferred upon a stepparent when that
individual accepts the obligations incident to a parental

marriage... the court may make such further decree as it shall deem expedient
concerning the custody or visitation... of the minor children of the
parties ....I"
d.
63 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (4) (West 1997). The statute states in
pertinent part: "[t]he court may order visitation between the petitioner or
intervenor and the child between whom a significant relationship exists upon a
finding supported by the evidence that the visitation is in the child's best
interests." Id
6 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 1995). The statute states in pertinent
part: "... [u]pon petition by a ...stepparent or person who has maintained a
relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child, the court may
grant
65 reasonable visitation rights to that person... ." Id.
Silverman, supra note 22, at 95 1.
66 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW, § 240 (McKinney 1995) provides in pertinent part:
"[iln any action or proceeding brought.., by petition.., the custody of or right
to visitation with any child of the marriage, the court shall enter order for
custody and support as in the court's discretion as justice requires having
regard.., to the best interests of the child." Id.
67 Carter v. Broderick, 644 P.2d 850, 852-53 (Alaska 1982) (citing Collins v.
Gilbraith, 403 N.E.2d 921, 922-24 (Ind. 1980)); Simpson v. Simpson. 586
S.W.2d 33, 35-36 (Ky. 1979); Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487, 488-89 (Okla.
1978); Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881-83 (1977); Gribble v. Gribble, 583
P.2d 64, 66-67 (Utah 1978).
68 Carter,644 P.2d at 853.
69
Id.; Gribble,583 P.2d at 66.
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relationship without a formal adoption. 70 In loco parentis status
confers the same rights as between a natural parent and a child.7 '
At common law, it was recognized that the stepparent-stepchild
relationship was terminated upon dissolution of the marriage
through death or divorce.72 However, death or divorce does not
dissolve the in loco parentis status of the stepparent. 73 As long as
to continue the kinship,
these participants in the relationship desire
74
survive.
status
the
by
conferred
all rights
Under the doctrine of in loco parentis, the stepparent must first
overcome the burden of establishing the threshold requirement that
a custodial and parental relationship exists between the stepparent
and child. 75 This may be established upon a showing that the
76
stepparent has taken an active role in the stepchild's life.
Evidentiary acts include the stepparent's active interest in the
stepchild(ren)'s education, school functions, the length of time
residing together, involvement in day-to-day care (including
discipline), proof of a close and loving relationship, and reference
to each other as parent and child.77

70 Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424,428 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).

7' Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66.
72 Id. at 67.
73 Id.
74id.

71 Hughes, 541 N.E.2d at 284. See also, ORE. REV. STAT. §109.119(6), which
provides in pertinent part:
['C]hild-parent relationship' means a relationship that exists or
did exist, in whole or in part, within six months preceding the
filing of an action ... and in which relationship a person having
physical custody of a child or residing in the same household as
the child supplied, or otherwise made available to the child, food,
clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the child
with necessary care, education and discipline, and which
relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled the child's
psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's physical

needs.

Id.76

Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 17 (Neb. 1991).

n Id.
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Hence, the status of in loco parentis equates the stepparent to a
natural parent; 78 and therefore, the mere status as a stepparent
should not preclude visitation privileges. 79 Courts have recognized
that a stepparent's concern for and devotion to a stepchild may be
just as strong as that of the natural parent. 80 Furthermore, the
stepparent-stepchild relationship may have fostered a deep, mutual
the
bond of love and affection.81 This may be especially true where
82
stepparent.
the
fact
in
was
loved
ever
has
child
only parent the
The denial of the right to visit with former stepchildren because
of the lack of a biological tie was first recognized as improper in
Pennsylvania in Spells v. Spells.83 The Spells court acknowledged
that the issue of whether a stepparent had standing to claim rights
of visitation was of first impression.84 The court found that for
over two years, the children's natural mother had denied the
stepfather contact with his stepchildren.85 The court held that the
length of time apart constituted a "striking absence of contact. '8 6
Recognizing that a stepparent and stepchild may have developed a
kinship that had strong bonds of love and devotion, the court held
that the lack of a biological tie would not preclude visitation solely
because of the mere status as a stepparent. 87 Moreover, the court
found that Pennsylvania courts recognized the doctrine of in loco
parentis88 and once it has been established that the stepparent has
been conferred that status, the right to visitation must be "jealously
guarded." 89 Therefore, recognition that the stepparent may be a
person in loco parentis, with the status of a natural parent, may

78

"Persons who... assume the role of parent must not be overlooked."

Haines, supra note 40, at 14.
79 Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978).

80 Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881 (Pa. 1977).

81 Id. at 881; see also Gribble, 583 P.2d at 68.
12 Spells, 378 A.2d at 881.
83 See generally, Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (holding that a petition for visitation is

not to be rejected solely upon party's mere status as a stepparent and not blood
relative).
84 Id.

85 id.
86 i.
87 Id.
88 id

at 881.

8

9 Id. at 883.
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now bring the stepparent within the statute 90 that provides
visitation rights to parents and third parties.
Opponents of stepparent visitation rights set forth the proposition
that there may be situations where a child has numerous
stepparents, and visitation by all would be disruptive, and as such,
not in the child's best interests. 9' Furthermore, opponents put
forward for consideration the issue that a myriad of biologically
unrelated third parties, 92 including the "butcher, the baker, and the
candlestick maker," 93 would have
standing to petition the court
94
child.
the
for
affection
based on
Consequently, the courts have balanced these concerns by
mandating that the stepparent seeking visitation must demonstrate
that he or she served in a parental and custodial capacity.95 This
prevents the door from being opened to those who have a mere
affection for the child, or who, solely by legal title as stepparent,
want to petition for and obtain visitation. 6 This methodology
protects the child from being used as a pawn by the ex-stepparent
in harassing the ex-spouse, 9 7 while providing standing to petition
for visitation by those who merit the right.

90 Carter v. Broderick, 644 P.2d 850, 853-54 (Alaska 1982).
91Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 19 (Neb. 1991). See also,
Wendi Swinson Slechter, The Visitation Rights of Former Stepparents or The
Visitation Rights of FormerStepchildren: Which Is It Really?, 32 U. LOUISVILLE
J.FAM. L. 901, 913-14 (1994) (remarking that multiple stepparents may be
problematic for the courts, for the court would have to determine who merits
visitation and on what terms).
92 Carter,644 P.2d at 855, n.5.
93 Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1979) (Stephenson, J.,
dissenting). See also Slechter, supra note 92 at 914 (noting that most
jurisdictions have built in safeguards that assist in minimizing this concern.
These safeguards include the doctrines of in loco parentis,the best interests of
the child, and [de facto parent, equitable parentage, and psychological
parentage]). See also, In re the Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa
1995) (holding where party is not biological parent, adoptive parent, foster
parent, or stepparent, the court should not "foster a superfluity of claims by
parties who shared a special relationship with children based neither upon
affinity nor consanguinity"). Id.
94 Carter,644 P.2d at 855.
95
Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d at 15.
9'Id.at 17.
97

Id. at 10-11.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss1/4

12

Hellman: Step Parent Visitation

1999]

STEP PARENT VISITATION
The Uniform MarriageandDivorce Act

B.

"The common law imposed no duties beyond those voluntarily
assumed by the stepparent." 98 It is the voluntary assumption of
obligations that confers the status of in loco parentis.99 This status
may only be terminated at the will of the stepparent [or
stepchild].100 As noted, the stepparent-stepchild relationship is
jeopardized by a marriage dissolution proceeding, and also upon
the death of the natural custodial parent, where the child's
natural parent seeks to terminate the rights
surviving non-custodial
t0 1
of the stepparent.
The family law fails to provide certainty and protection for
stepparents, since there is a substantive preference in favor of the
natural parent against stepparents, and many state statutes are
ambiguous pertaining to stepparent visitation rights.' 0 2 This
substantive preference has been superseded at times where courts
have extended the language of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act' °3 in order to award stepparents visitation, although the statute
exclusively deals with the fights of natural parents. 104
Under the common law, stepparents had rights to their
stepchildren, which were derived from the marriage to the child's

98 Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the StepparentChild Relationship,70 CORNELLL. REV. 38,42 (1984).
99
0

Id

I oI

101

Id. at 61.

102

d.at 62.

103 UNIF. MARRIAGE

& DIVORCE Acr, PART IV,

§ 401(D), 9A U.L.A. (1987)

states in pertinent part: "A child custody proceeding is commenced in the

J court: (1) by a parent, by filing a petition (i) for dissolution or
L
legal separation; or (ii)for custody of the child in the [county, judicial district]
in which he is permanently resident or found; or (2) by a person other than a
parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child in the [county, judicial
district] in which he is permanently resident or found, but only ifhe is not in the

physical custody of one of his parents." [emphasis added]; see Bryan v. Bryan,
645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. 1982) (holding welfare of the child protected by broad

reading); see also Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (holding where child is
not in custody of biological parent, stepparent must show unfitness of biological
parent).
104Mahoney, supra note 99, at 69.
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natural parent.10 5 Once the marriage was terminated, so was the
stepparent-stepchild relationship.10 6
However, courts have
consistently with the language in the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act awarded custody or visitation to the stepparent where
the stepparent
had physical custody of the child at the date of the
10 7
petition.
C.

The Child Custody JurisdictionAct

The Child Custody Jurisdiction Act'0 8 provides standing to a
person who claims a right to visitation with respect to a child, and
to a person acting as a parent who has physical custody of the
child. Currently thirty-six
states have approved the Child Custody
09
Act.'
Jurisdiction
105 Peggy Blotner, Third Party Custody and Visitation: How Many Ways
Should We Slice The Pie?, 1989 DET. C. L. REV. 163, 172 (1989).
06id. at 172.
10
Id., but cf Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilitiesfor Extended Family

Members?, 27 FAM. L. Q. 191, 195 (1993). The drafters of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act intended to deny third party's standing except under
limited circumstances. Id.
10' UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT

§ 2(9) 9 U.L.A. (1987). The

statute states in pertinent part: " 'person.acting as parent' means a person, other
than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and who either has been
awarded custody by a court or claims a right to custody." Id. Moreover, section
2(1) states: " 'contestant' means a person, including a parent, who claims a right
to custody or visitation rights with respect to a child." Id.
109 The following states have incorporated the CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
ACT: ALA. CODE §§ 30-3(20)-(44) (1975); AS §§ 25.30.010 to 25.30.910;
ARIz. REV. .STAT. §§ 25 (431)-(454) (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14131(101)-(126) (West 1997); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §§ 46b(90)-114 (West
1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1901 to 1925 (1998); FLA.. STAT. ANN. §
61.1302-1348 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-9(40)-(64) (1978); HAW
REV. STAT. §§ 583(1)-(26) (1998); IDAHO CODE §§ 32 (1101)-(1126) (1999);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/(1)-(26) (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-

3(l)-(25) (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1- 598 A.125 (West 1998);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38(1301)-(1326) (1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 403(400)(630) (Banks-Baldwin 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13(1700 )-(1724) (West
1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1701-1725 (West 1979); MD. CODE
ANN. FAMILY LAW §§ 9(201)-(224) (1998); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209B,
§§ 1-14 (West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600(651) -(673) (West
1961); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452(440)-(550) (West 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
40-7(101)- (125) (Smith 1977); NEV. REV. STAT.. §§ 125A(010)-(250) (1979);
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TRACKING THE HISTORY
VISITATION RIGHTS

OF STEPPARENT

In 1976, in the landmark case In re Bennett v. Jeffreys,"10 the
New York Court of Appeals recognized an exception to the
doctrine of parental privilege.'' The court held that state
interference in a parent-child relationship was warranted when
extraordinary circumstances were present. 112 A young unwed
mother had voluntarily, but not formally, placed her child with her
mother's friend.! 13 A few years later, she instituted 14a proceeding in
order to obtain custody from the child's custodian."
The court opined that the right of a parent to the custody of his
or her child would not be "enforced inexorably" where
extraordinary circumstances were manifest,"15 since it would be
contrary to the best interests of the child to do so."16 The best7
interests of the child superseded the parental absolute right."1

Since a child has rights, he is not a sub-person subjected to
absolute control by the natural parent." 8 As such, the court held

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458-A(1)-(25) (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A34(28)(52) (West 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-10(1)-(24); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW §§
75(a)-(z) (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A(l)-(25) (1979); NDCC
14-14-01 to 14-14-26; OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3109(21)-37) (West 1977); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. §§ 501-527 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109(700)-(930)
(1973); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341-5366; R.I. GEN. LAWS 15-14(1)-(26)
(1956); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-5A(l)-(26) (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-6(201)-(225) (1979); TEX. FAMv. CODE ANN. §§ (001)-(025) (Vest
1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45)c)-26 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§

1031-1051 (1979); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20(125)-(146) (Michie 1950); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.27(010)-(910) (West 1979); W. VA. CODE §§48-10(1)(26) (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ . 822(01)-(25); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-

5(101)- 20-5(125) (Michie 1977).
110 Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821
(1976).
..Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
" Id. at 544,356 N.E.2d at 280,387 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
13 id.
14 Id. at 545, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
1 5 Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
16Id. at 545-46,356 N.E.2d at 281-82, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25.
17 Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
118 Id.
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that a child's rights and interests werej~aramount and not
subordinated to the parental right to custody.
Furthermore, intervention by the state was prescribed where
there was a finding of "surrender, abandonment, unfitness,
persistent neglect; unfortunate or involuntary extended disruption
of custody, or other equivalent but rare or extraordinary
circumstances."' 2 0 Moreover, the court implicitly acknowledged
the doctrine of the psychological parent, as the court held that a
child, who had been in the custody of a non-parent for such an
extended duration, would be psychologically traumatized
due to
21
the separation of the child and its surrogate parent.'
As noted previously, in the 1977 Pennsylvania case of first
impression, Spells v. Spells,122 a stepfather petitioned the court for
the right to visit his two stepchildren. 123 The Spells court also
implicitly recognized the doctrine of the psychological parent,
noting that stepparents and their stepchildren may have developed
Z
mutual bonds of affection. 124 As such, the non-existence of a
biological tie
was insufficient to deny the stepparent visitation
25
privileges. 1
In addition, the Spells court noted that the state of Pennsylvania
recognized the status of in loco parentis.126 It found that under this
doctrine, when a stepparent assumed a parental role, that individual
was conferred the same rights and liabilities as between a natural
parent and child. 27 Therefore, whether the stepparent stood as a
person in loco parentis was a relevant factor in determining
128
whether he or she should be accorded visitation privileges.
However, the court ruled that a determination that one is deemed
to be in loco parentis does not automatically confer visitation
privileges. 1 9 These privileges must also be in the best interests of
119 Id.
'2

121

Id. at 550, 356 N.E.2d at 284, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
Id.

'22

378 A.2d 879, 881 (Pa. 1970).

123 id.

id.
1251d.
124

126 Id.
'27

Id. at 881-82.

Id. at 882.
129 Id.
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the child. 130 The stepparent must be allowed to demonstrate what
his relationship is to the stepchild(ren), and why his interest in
visitation should be protected. 13 1
In the 1978 case Gribble v. Gribble,32 a stepfather sought
visitation with his stepchild, and asserted that he treated his
stepchild like his natural offspring, felt an affinity towards him,
and was concerned about the child's future welfare. 3 3 The Utah
statuteM provided that the court shall consider what is in the best
interests of the child when determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other relatives. 135 The court ascertained that the
child's welfare136 was of paramount importance in a visitation
determination.
The court opined that although a stepparent-stepchild
relationship conferred no rights upon the stepparent at common
law, the stepparent may have assumed the status of in loco parentis
and thereby was elevated into a different category. 137 The person
standing in loco parentis38now had equivalent status as a natural
parent regarding its child.
Moreover, the court looked to Spells and adopted that court's
view that a stepparent's visitation rights must be carefully guarded
where a stepparent is a person in loco
parentis and when it is in the
139
so.
do
to
child
the
of
interests
best
The beginning of the next decade brought Carterv. Brodrickl4 °
a case of first impression in Alaska,14 1 where the court explored the
issue of whether a stepparent could petition for visitation under a
130

id.

13 1 Id at 883.
132 583 P.2d 64

(Utah 1978).

133 Id. at 65.
134 UTAH CODE ANN., § 30-3-5 (1953).
15 Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66.

136 Id.
137 id.
131 Id. at 67. The court defines in loco parentis as "one who has assumed the
status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption." Id.
139 Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978) (citing the Spells' decision

as being directly on point in that a child's interests are of foremost concern but
the court must also recognize that when someone is deemed in loco parentishis
rights to visitation must be jealously guarded).
'40
141

644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982).

Id. at 852.
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statute 142 that provided for visitation "of any child of the
marriage., 143 The stepfather asserted that where one is deemed in
loco parentis, and thus has an identical right to visitation as would
a natural parent, then the child is "of the marriage." 144 Therefore,
he would 145
be authorized under the statute to obtain visitation
privileges.
The court stated that the doctrine of psychological parentage was
infused in the common law doctrine of in loco parentis.146 Citing
Gribble v. Gribble,147 the court noted that by assuming the status
of in loco parentis, the stepparent had the same rights
as a natural
48
parent and was therefore brought within the statute.
In 1984 in Trapp v. Trapp,149 a stepfather sought visitation
150
privileges under New York's Family Court Act, section 65 1(b).

142 Id.See AS § 09.55.205:

In an action for divorce or for legal separation the court
may... during the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing
or at any time thereafter during the minority of any child of the
marriage, make an order for the custody of or visitation with the
minor child which may seem necessary and proper and may at any
time modify or vacate the order.
Id.

Carter, 644 P.2d at 853. The court recognized that there needs to be a
determination of whether the parent stands in loco parentis.If so, then the court
is to consider the best interests of the child when determining if visitation is to
be granted. Id.
'44 Id. at 853.
145
Id.
146Id. The court noted that "[o]f the six jurisdictions that ruled on stepparent
141

visitation five have recognized it . . .on the premise that the stepparent has
become a surrogate parent." Id. The court stated that this concept is called
"psychological parentage" which "finds its legal basis ... in the common law
doctrine of in loco parentis." Id.
14'583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).
148 Id. at 853-54. Where the court recognized that a stepparent who lived with
the child most of the child's life, cared for as well as treated him as his
biological son, while the natural father had no contact with the child, was
conferred "the same rights as a natural parent and thus [brought the] stepparent
within the statute." Id.
149126 Misc. 2d 30,480 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Fam. Ct 1984).
150Id. See generally, FAMILY COURT ACT, § 651(b) (McKinney's 1995)
(stating that "[w]hen initiated in the family court, the family court has
jurisdiction to determine.... habeas corpus proceedings and proceedings
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The court stated that the statute relied upon by the stepparent only
provided the court with jurisdiction to determine matters of
visitation; it did not specifically enumerate who in fact had
standing to seek such a determination. 151 However, the court did
find that it was a general consensus among the New York courts
that if a stepparent had an interest in the child's
welfare, then that
15 2
person had standing to petition for visitation.
Furthermore, the court acknowledged the principle that where
extraordinary circumstances exist, the paramount concern for the
15 3
welfare of the child overrides the parental privilege to custody.
In this instance, the court determined that the stepfather had
resided with the stepchild for a period of nine years, and a kinship
had developed between them, which, if severed, would drastically
affect the stepchild. 154 Therefore, an extraordinary circumstance
existed, and15the
stepparent's right to visitation should be judicially
5
determined.
The end of the decade brought Honaker v. Bumside1 6 in 1989,
where a stepfather was awarded visitation privileges with his
stepdaughter after his wife was killed in a motor vehicle accident,
and the natural father obtained custody of his daughter.15 7 The
court held that the child's welfare is the olar star by which the
discretion of the court will be guided."' 5 The court determined
that visitation by the stepfather was warranted, since visitation was

brought by petition and order to show cause, for the determination of the

custody or visitation of minors. ..").
151 Trapp, 126 Misc. 2d 30,480 N.Y.S. 2d at 979.
52

1 See id. at 979-80. See also Humphrey v. Humphrey, 103 Misc. 2d 175,425
N.Y.S. 2d 759 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980); In Re Smith v. Lascaris, 106 Misc. 2d
1044,432 N.Y.S.2d 995 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980).
153 Trapp v. Trapp, 126 Misc. 30, 31, 480 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980 (N.Y. Faro. Ct.
1984). "[I]t is only on such a premise that the courts may then proceed to
inquire into the best interest of the child and to order a custodial disposition on
that ground." Id. (citing In re Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d
277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821(1976)).
155Id.
156 388

S.E.2d 322 (W. Va.1989).

'57 Id. at 323-25.
158 Id. at 324 (citing

Kiger v. Hancock, 153 W. Va. 404, 405, 168 S.E.2d

798,799 (1969)).
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not solely for the benefit of the adults involved,
59 but also for the
fulfillment of the child's emotional well being.'
The granting of visitation privileges now rested partly upon
ensuring that the child is not deprived of its right to the
continuance of a close relationship with people that it considers a
part of its family.160 As a result, the stepparent now must show that
he or she was in a custodial or parental capacity and that the award
of visitation privileges would be in the best interests of the child in
that it would foster the continuance of the familial kinship between
the stepparent and the stepchild. 161
The case of Hughes v. Banning 62 was also heard in 1989, where
a stepmother filed a petition for visitation with her stepchild after
the child's natural father was murdered. 163 Indiana did not
recognize any statutory authority that provided for visitation to
unrelated third parties.164 However, the court acknowledged that a
third party might establish visitation privileges where there is a
showing of a custodial and parental capacity and that the third
party visitation would be in the best interests of the child. 65
Finding that the stepmother cared for her stepchild full time while
the natural father was employed outside the home, that there was
evidence of a warm kinship between them, and that the stepmother
represented a symbolic representation of the child's father, the

159 Id. at 325. The West Virginia court determined that "[v]isitation is for the
benefit of the parent but it is the interest of the child and the benefit of the child
which will be the determining factor in the granting of visitation rights." Id.
160 Id. at 326. The court noted that denying visitation rights to her stepfather
and stepbrother would compound the tragedy of the child losing her mother,
which was one of the three close relationships that the child possessed. Id.

161Id.
162

541 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App 1989).

163

Id. at 283-84.

164
165

Id. at 284.
The court noted that the legislature had not recognized the right to

visitation, and nonetheless imposed such a right according to case law. Id.
(citing Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921 (1980); Tinsley v. Plummer, 519
N.E.2d 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)). The court also stated that "[t]o establish
visitation, a third person must first show that a custodial and parental
relationship exists and then, that visitation with the third person would be in the
'best interest of the child."' Hughes, 541 N.E.2d at 284. (citing Tinsley, 519
N.E.2d at 754).
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court determined
that the stepmother should be awarded
1 66
visitation.
The next decade brought Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 167 where a
stepparent petitioned for visitation with his stepchild.168 The court
acknowledged the common law principle that natural parents had1 69a
prinma facie absolute right to the control of their children.
However, the court held that under certain circumstances, 70 a nonparent may obtain visitation privileges and thereby supersede the
when the visitation would further the
rights of the natural parent,
7
best interests of the child.' '
Late in 1991, the Supreme Court of Nebraska heard
Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 172 where a stepfather petitioned the
court in order to obtain visitation with his stepdaughter. 73 The
natural mother objected to the visitation, postulating that the
stepfather was only interested in visitation in order to harass the
mother.174 The stepfather claimed that he had a kinship with his
stepdaughter, that he participated in her daily activities, disciplined
her his daughter while the child
her when appropriate, and called
75
referred to him as her "daddy."1

166 Hughes, 541

N.E.2d at 284-85.
(Ala. Civ. App. 1990).

167 563 So.2d 1032
161 Id. at 1033.
169 Id.
170 See

id. (finding that a stepparent is not precluded from visitation privileges

in appropriate circumstances where it is in the best interest of the child); In re
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d. 543, 546, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821, 824-25 (1976) (holding that the best interest of the child supersedes the
parental absolute right where a finding of "surrender, abandonment, unfitness.
persistent neglect, unfortunate or involuntary extended disruption of custody or
other equivalent but rare or extraordinary circumstances exist); Trapp v. Trapp,
126 Misc. 2d at 30, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 980 (finding that extraordinary
circumstances such as severing psychological parent from child, created a
traumatic event); Honaker v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322, 326 (W. Va. 1989)
(allowing visitation in order to vindicate the child's right to continue a
relationship with the stepparent who the child considers a part of her family).
171Shoemaker, 563 So.2d at 1033-34.
'72 477 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1991).
'73 Id. at 10.
174Id. at 10-11.
175 Id. at 11. The court noted that it was the best interests of the child that was
at stake, therefore the stepfather was granted visitation rights. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1999], Art. 4

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

The court provided an historical analysis of the leading cases
dealing with the issue of stepparent visitation. It recognized that
the first jurisdiction to examine this issue was Pennsylvania in
Spells v. Spells, 176 where it was held that a stepparent who stood in
loco parentis was considered to possess the same rights to
visitation as would a natural parent. 177 Examining Gribble v.
Gribble,178 the court found that the Utah statute179 provided for
visitation by "other relatives," and that a stepparent in loco
80
parentis was brought within the terms of the statute.'
Furthermore, the court explained that the state had an interest in
the child's welfare when the state's divorce laws affected that
child. 8 '
Next, the court discussed Carter v. Brodrick,182 where a
stepparent was brought within the statute upon a showing that the
stepparent was in loco parentis with his stepchild and therefore the
child was "of the marriage."18 3 The court then referred to Looper v.
McManus, 84 and held that the focus of the propriety of visitation
was upon providing the stable, emotional well being of the child,
and not solely for the pleasure of the adult. 85 Moreover, visitation
by a stepparent may be proper so that the child is not "stripped of
the right to continue a close relationship with people [the child]
considers... family."' 86 In addition, the court recognized that
there were no specific prohibitions against allowing stepparent
visitation privileges, 87 and that such an award may be made if it is
176 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
177

Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 12.

178 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).
179
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953).

Gribble, 583 P.2d at 64.
181Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Neb. 1991) See
180

generally, Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (stating there is
a legitimate state interest in child's welfare where child's home is to be divided
by state's divorce laws).
182 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982).
183 Hickenbottoin, 477 N.W.2d at 14.
184 581 P.2d 487 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
185
Id.

477 N.W.2d at 14 (quoting Honaker, 388 S.E.2d at 326).
See generally Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So.2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. Civ.

186 Hickenbottom,
187

App. 1990) (stating no prohibition against ex-stepparent from seeking and being
awarded visitation in appropriate circumstances).
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in the best interests of the child.18 8 Therefore, stepparent visitation
is appropriate where the stepparent demonstrates that he or she is
in a parental and custodial capacity,18 9 thereby deemed to be 'in
loco parentis with the minor child, 190 and that the visitation is in
the child's best interests.'91
In 1992, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota heard Simmons v.
Simmons.192 In this case, a stepfather petitioned for visitation with
his stepson. 93 The court held that visitation would be awarded
upon a finding that such visitation was in the child's best interests,
and if there was a psychological parentage bond between the
stepparent and the stepchild.' 94 In addition, the court mentioned
that a child's preference would be considered if the child was
95
deemed to be of sufficient maturity to express such a preference.1
Apparently, the court felt that the psychological parentage
doctrine and the doctrine of in loco parentis were inexplicably
intertwined, since the court held that a person 1in loco parentis with
the former stepchild was entitled to visitation. 9
In 1994 in Caban v. Healey,197 an Indiana court awarded a
stepparent visitation with a stepchild where it was demonstrated
that a custodial and parental relationship existed, and the child's
best interests would198be furthered by the continuance of contact
with the stepparent.
Thus, courts have awarded stepparents the right to visitation
utilizing the doctrines of in loco parentis and psychological
parentage, and as will be discussed, by the doctrines of "equitable
parent" and "de facto parent."

Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d
Id. at 15.
190 Id. at 17.
191 Id. at 16.
188

at 14.

189

192 486 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. CL App. 1992).
193 Id. at 790.
194
id.

195 id.
196 Id. at 791.

197 634 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
'9' Id. at 543.
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IV. STEPPARENT'S VISITATION RIGHTS ARISING
THROUGH GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY199
A. The Doctrine of "In Loco Parentis"
Courts have relied on a stepparent's status as a person in loco
parentis in order to allow visitation in situations that otherwise
would have been statutorily precluded.20 0 For example, in states
where statutory language provides for visitation where the child is
"of the marriage," if the stepparent stood in loco parentis, then the
issue to be considered is, whether "[the] stepchild [is] a 'child of
the marriage?"' If the child2 0is deemed as such, then the stepparent
could petition for visitation. '
Under Alaskan statute, a court may grant visitation to a person
during the minority of a child of the marriage.2 0 2 In Carter v.
Brodrick,20 3 an ex-stepfather appealed a Superior Court order
denying him visitation with his stepchild. 2 04 The stepfather
claimed that he was the only psychological father that his stepchild
had ever known.2 0 5 The court analogized the psychological parent
to a parent in loco parentis and held that where a stepparent is
conferred the status of in loco parentis, the stepchild is a "child of
199
A relatively recent development, some jurisdictions now extend visitation
rights to stepparents despite the absence of statutory authorization to do so,
utilizing the doctrine of in loco parentis in order to bring the stepparent within
visitation statutes. See Susan M. Silverman, Stepparent Visitation Rights:
Towards the Best Interests of the Child, 30 J. FAM. L. 943, 952 (1991/92).
200 See Evans v. Evans, 488 A.2d 157, 161 (Md. 1985) (citing Carter v.
Broderick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982)); see also Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d
64 (Utah 1978).
21 See Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 852 (Alaska 1982).
2
2ALASKA STAT. s.25.24.150(a) (1995) states in pertinent part:
In an action for divorce or for legal separation, .. . the court
may .... during the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing
or at any time thereafter during the minority of a child of the
marriage, make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or
visitation with the minor child that may seem necessary or proper,
including an order that provides for visitation by a grandparent or
other person if that is in the best interests of the child.
Id.
20' 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982).
204 Id. at 85 1.
5
20 Id.
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the marriage." 2°6 This brought the stepparent within the statute
thereby allowing him to petition for visitation.
New York has three statutes that authorize standing to parties
petitioning for visitation. 20 7 The first statute, New York Domestic
Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL"), section 70(a),208 provides that
"either parent" has standing to petition the Supreme Court of New
York for an adjudication of visitation matters.20 9 In S.M.M.v.
Comm'r of Social Services,21 a visitation action involving a
stepparent and a natural parent was before the court. 21 The court
held that the statute did not confer standing upon the stepparent
since the court interpreted the term "either parent" to mean a
"natural parent." 212
Under DRL section 240(1),213 the right to visitation with any
"child of the marriage" between the parties lies within the
discretion of the court.2 1 4 Although the statute is silent on who may
petition the court, the Conm'r of Social Services court held that the
phrase "child of the parties" meant a biological parent-child
relationship.2-t However, the court did state that this section "does
not specifically limit standing to parents," and may be of limited
utility to a stepparent, although the statute was intended to apply
primarily to natural parents.2 tb
2"Id.
at 855.
207 See In re Janet S.M.M. v. Comm'r of Social Services, 158 Misc. 2d 851,
854, 601 N.Y.S.2d 781,784 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993).
20' N.Y. DOM.

REL. LAW

§ 70 (a) (McKinney 1995) provides in pertinent part:

which may
"either parent may apply to the supreme court... and ...
" Id.
award... custody of such child to either parent ....
2o9 Id. See also Conun'r of Social Services, 158 Misc. 2d at 855, 601 N.Y.S.2d
at 783.
210 158 Misc. 2d 851, 601 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1993).
211 Id.
22Id.at 853, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
213 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1) (McKinney's 1995) states in pertinent part:
"[i]n any action... by petition... the custody of or right to visitation with any

child of a marriage, the court must give such direction, between the
parties .... as [with]in the court's discretion .. " Id.
214 Conmn'r of Social Services, 158 Misc. 2d at 855, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 783
(quoting
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1) (McKinney's 1995)).
2 15
Id.at 853, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
21
6Id.The court stated that:
[S]ection 240(3)(2) permits the court to issue an Order of
Protection which 'may require any party.. .to permit a parent to
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In Humphrey v. Humphrey and In re Smith v. Lascaris, the
courts recognized that under the Family Court Act, section
651(b),2 17 "anyone who has an interest in the welfare of a child has
standing to petition for custody. 2 18 The court in Comm'r of Social
Services proclaimed that even this statute does not specifically
21 9
enumerate who in fact has standing to petition for visitation.
B. The Doctrine of "De Facto Parent"

In addition to in loco parentis status, a person who assumes the
role of a child's parent, fulfilling both the child's psychological
and physical needs for care and affection on a day-to-day basis,
may be deemed a de facto parent.220 A stepparent may be deemed a
de facto parent and obtain an award of visitation upon a showing
visit the child at stated periods.' Although section 240 does not
specifically limit standing to parents, the close proximity of the
terms 'parents' and 'parties,' the apparent use of the terms
interchangeably, especially in the phrase 'child of the parties,' ...
demonstrate that the statute was intended to apply primarily to
custody disputes between parents. [Section] 240 is, therefore, of
limited utility here where petitioner is a non-parent having no
relationship by either blood or marriage to the child.
Id.

217 FAMILY COURT

ACT § 651(b) says in pertinent part: "[W]hen initiated in
the family court, the family court has jurisdiction to determine.., proceedings
brought by petition.., for the determination of the custody or visitation of
minors .... N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 65 1(b) (McKinney 1995).
218 Trapp v. Trapp, 126 Misc. 30, 480 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1984)
(quoting Humphrey v. Humphrey, 103 Misc.2d 175, 425 N.Y.S.2d 759; In re
Smith, 106 Misc.2d 1044, 432 N.Y.S.2d 995).
219 Id. at 784. See generally Humphrey, 425 N.Y.S.2d at
759 (stating the
statute is silent as to who may initiate action); see also In re Smith, 432
N.Y.S.2d 995 (stating although statute silent about who may initiate a
proceeding, "any person who has an interest in the welfare of a child has
standing to sue").
220 Kristine L. Burks, Redefining Parenthood: Child Custody and
Visitation
When NontraditionalFamiliesDissolve, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 223, 245
(1994). See also In re B.G., 523 P.2d at 252 (finding that the 'de facto parent's'
interest in a visitation proceeding is a substantial one); In re Joel H. et al. v.
Diane L., 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (stating [a] de facto parent is
a person who, on a daily basis, over a substantial period of time, seeks to fulfill
the physical and psychological needs of the child by assuming the role of a
parent).
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that (1) the de facto parent-child relationship is of extended
duration, (2) involving a reciprocity of conduct in which the child
expressly manifests, or by implication, that the petitioner is its
parent, 221 and (3) it would be detrimental to the child to deny
visitation.222
C. The Doctrine of "EquitableParent"
A person may be accorded the status of "equitable parent" where
the petitioner is a non-biological "parent" who wishes to obtain
such recognition by showing the willingness to accept the
obligations of supporting the child in return for "reciprocal rights"
of visitation. 223 The elements of "equitable parent" status are: (1)
the stepparent and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship
as parent and child, or (2) the biological parent of the child
cooperated in fostering such relationship, (3) the non-biological
party wants to obtain the rights afforded to a natural parent, and (4)
the non-biological party is willing to pay child support. 4 This
doctrine is significant in that it is based upon the non-biological
party's relationship with the225child, not upon that party's marriage
to the child's natural parent.
In Atkinson v. Atkinson,226 the petitioner argued that the court
erred in treating him as a third party seeking visitation, rather than
recognizing him as a parent due to the close father-son relationship
they shared. 227 The plaintiff asked that the court adopt the doctrine
of "equitable
parent," which the court found to be a novel
228
request. 8 Holding that the Michigan Child Custody Act was
The minor must be of sufficient age and capacity to understand the meaning
of a parental relationship. it re the Marriage of Halpern, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740,
748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
222 Id. at 748. But cf. Clifford S. v. The Superior Court of San Diego County,
45 Cal. Rptr.2d 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding [die facto parenthood status
does not confer rights and responsibilities of biological parent, and de facto
parents do not have rights to reunification services, custody or visitation).
2,3
Burks, supra note 222, at 252.
224
id.
225 Id. at 252-53.
226 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
227
Id. at 519.
Mid.
221
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equitable in nature, the court granted the petitioner's request to be
as the petitioner met all
accorded the status of "equitable parent,"
229
the necessary elements of the doctrine.
D. The Doctrine of PsychologicalParentage
It is in the best interest of the child to protect its relationship with
a stepparent when that kinship is based upon psychological
parentage.230 Removal of a "pschological parent" from a child's
life may be a traumatic event.23 The severance of a psychological
parent-child relationship may be even more traumatic and
devastating than the separation between a child and its natural
parent.232 Courts have recognized that a relationship between a
stepparent and stepchild may exist which has fostered a
psychological parent-wanted child affiliation. 233 Where a third
party and a child profess a secure and stable relationship, that third
,,234
The doctrine of
party emerges as a "psychological parent.
psychological parentage is necessarily intertwined with the
doctrine of in loco parentis. Where an individual, in this instance a
stepparent, interacts on a day-to-day basis with the stepchild,
providing care, love, and companionship, that child may view the
stepparent as an essential focus in its life.235

Id. The court found that where the petitioner is not a biological parent of a
child born or conceived during the marriage, the party may be considered the
natural parent of that child if:
(1) the party and the child have a relationship that is mutually
acknowledged as parent and child, or (2) where the biological
parent has cooperated in fostering such a relationship over a
period of time, and (3) the party desires to have the rights afforded
to a parent, and (4) is willing to accept the responsibility of paying
child support.
229

Id.
Carter v. Broderick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982).
Alberto B. v. Rosa 0., 102 Misc. 2d 147,149, 423 N.Y.S.2d 111, 114 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1979).
232 Doe v. Doe, 92 Misc. 2d 184, 187, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
230

231

1977).
233

Carter,644

234 Doe,
235

P.2d at 853.
92 Misc. 2d at 187, 399 N.Y.S. 2d at 982.

id.
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A Minnesota court of appeals recognized that a stepparent might
indeed be a "psychological parent." 236 That court held that an
award of visitation is predicated upon a finding that established
emotional bonds existed between the stepp arent and stepchild,
which created a parent-child relationship.2 7 Where there is a
bonding and close personal relationship, the third party becomes
the "psychological parent" to whom the child turns for its
emotional needs.238
The resolution of the factual dispute of the petitioning party's
motivation to assume the status of in loco parentis or
"psychological parent" is only the first inquiry.239 In loco parentis
or "psychological parentage" status is not sufficient by itself to
confer fights of visitation on a stepparent. It only provides the
240
stepparent with a means of coming within a visitation statute.
The court then considers whether visitation by the stepparent is in
the best interest of the child. 24' It is this factor that is dispositive
in
242
visitation.
stepparent
of
denial
or
recommendation
court's
the
V.

THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE
WEIGHT OF THE PREFERENCE OF THE CHILD
243
IN STEPPARENT VISITATION PETITIONS?

The propriety of a court to consider a child's perspective was
recognized over one hundred and forty years ago in Curtis v.

Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct.App. 1992).
7 Id. at 790.
23
236

238

Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740,743 (N.D. 1986).

239 Carter,644 P.2d at 855 (Alaska 1982).

240 Hughes v. Banning, 541 N.E.2d 283,284 (Ind. 1989).
241 Id.at 284; see also Carter,644 P.2d at 855 (Alaska 1982).
242 Carter,644 P.2d at 855.
243 See generally ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (1995) (visitation

order with

minor child that may seem necessary or proper if it is in the best interests of the
child); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (1995) (the court shall be guided by
the best interests of child); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) (1995) (visitation may
be awarded if it is in the best interests of the child); MICH. CoM.P. LAWS. ANN.
§ 722.27.7(1)(1995) (child's best interests of paramount importance in
determination of visitation rights); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1994)
(visitation rights awarded if to do so is in the best interests of the child); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-302(a) (1995) (visitation to be awarded upon a finding that it
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Curtis.244 In 1855, a minor of 16 years brought an action against
her mother asking that the court recognize her wishes to remain
with a family of Shakers, which was against her mother's
wishes. 245 The court held that it was "established custom" to
inquire about a minor's opinion, 246 and that the weight depended
on "maturity of mind and capacity to judge."'247 After an
examination with the child, the court determined that a minor of
sixteen years had the capacity and will to make judgments, 248 and
that she249was able to decide what would promote her own
welfare.

Courts have an obligation as parenspatriae of children,250 and in
visitation cases the preferential method of determining the child's
desires is to conduct an in camera interview with the child.25 ' A
child of sufficient age and maturity should be allowed to articulate
his or her preferences to the court. 52 Consideration of a child's
view may assist the court in determining his or her attitude and
enlighten the court to the relevant facts. 2 This may be especially
true where resolution of disputed factual issues are determinative

would be in the best interests of the child to do so); see also Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.245(1) (1995) (specifically enumerating that visitation rights are to be
determined by what is in the best interests of the child); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 571-46(3) (which states: "[ilf a child is of sufficient age and capacity to
reason, so as to form an intelligent preference, the child's wishes as to custody
shall be considered and be given due weight by the court"). Id.
244 Curtis v. Curtis, 71 Mass. 535 (1855).
245 Id. at 535-36.
246 Id. at 537 (stating that "the right to the custody and control of a female of
an age to have a will, and a capacity to form some judgment for herself, it is the
established custom of the court to ascertain the opinion or inclination of the
minor").
24 7
Id.

248 id.
249

Id. The court ruled that the child was free from the custody of her mother

and was free to go to her guardian appointed by law. Id.
250 Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 80 A.D.2d 310, 312, 588 N.Y.S.2d 596,
600 (1990).
251 Id. at 311-312, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
252

id.

253

Dintruff v. McGreevy, 34 N.Y.2d 887, 316 N.E.2d 716, 359 N.Y.S.2d 281

(1974).
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pertaining to the stepparent's custodial and parental relationship
with the stepchild. 2S4
While in camera interviews with a child are not mandatory, z 5
when a child ossesses "sufficient intelligence, understanding, and
experience,"
his or her preference may be a factor to be
considered in a stepparent visitation proceeding. 257 Moreover, if a
child expresses a preference in an in camera interview, providing
the court with some indication of what is in the best interests of the
child, that preference must be weighed against the child's age and
maturity.258

While an expressed preference is important, especially if the
child is mature, it is not dispositive.2 9 The child may have suffered

the trauma of a fragmented home and possibly the stress of its
stepparent and natural parent vying for its allegiance. 260 These
factors may subtract from the child's competency to weigh

intelligently the prevailing factors necessary to make a wise choice
regarding stepparent visitation.26
Consideration of what is in the best interests of the child

necessitates consideration of the child's subjective perspective
balanced by dependable objective criteria. 262 Furthermore, the
courts must consider whether any undue influence was exerted

upon the child.263
While the wishes of a child are to be afforded some

consideration when determining what is in the best interests of a
child, 264 it is within the discretion of the trial court in determining
2 In re Maloney, 90 A.D.2d 551, 455 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982).
255 Bazant v.Bazant, 80 A.D.2d 310, 312, 439 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524 (N.Y. App.
Div.
1981).
256 Patzer
v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740,742 (N.D. 1986).
25

id.

258 Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1264, 451
N.Y.S.2d 658,662 (1982).
259 Martin v. Martin, 74 A.D.2d 419, 427, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1008 (N.Y.
Ag. Div. 1980).

261

Id.

id.
262 Ebert v. Ebert, 38 N.Y.2d 700, 703, 346 N.E.2d 240, 242, 382 N.Y.S.2d
472,474 (1976).
263
Eschbach,56 N.Y.2d at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1264, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
264 Doe, 92 Misc. 2d at 187, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
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the weight it will accord a child's preference. 65 Where a child's
age and maturity afford meaningful articulation of his or her
266
preferences, great weight should be accorded to that input,
although the child's wishes are not determinative.267 Consideration
of a child's perspective may be important, where resolution of
disputed factual issues, as to whether a stepparent was in a parental
capacity, are at issue and the child is not of tender
and custodial
68
years.

2

Where the child is of tender years, an in camera interview may
be inappropriate. 269 A child of tender years must be deemed
"competent to weigh intelligently the factors necessary to make a
wise choice [regarding stepparent visitation]., 270 However, a court
appointed law guardian and the utilization of forensic and other
appropriate agencies would assist the court in rendering its
determination.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of an express statutory grant providing for
stepparent visitation, the courts should allow a stepparent to
demonstrate that standing as either a person in loco parentis, a "de
facto parent," an "equitable parent," or "psychological parent" in
relation to the stepchild, and that the requested visitation is in the
best interests of the child.
With the ever changing familial situations in society, state
legislatures should take notice that a stepparent may be a vital
force in the stepchild's life, and as such, statutory enactments
reflecting this ideology should be forthcoming.

265
266

2 Foster and Freed, LAW AND THE FAMILY, § 29.12.
Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 80 A.D.2d 310, 312, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596,

599 (1990).
27 Ebert, 38 N.Y.2d at 703, 346 N.E.2d at 242, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
268 In re Maloney, 90 A.D.2d at 551,455 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
269 Blake v. Blake, 106 A.D.2d 916, 483 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
270

Bazant, 80 A.D.2d at 312, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 524.

271

Blake, 106 A.D.2d at 916, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
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